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considered by the Council when the decision was made, that redress was
possible, and that she had exhausted administrative remedies.
Concerning the first of these requirements, the Court stated that
prejudice requires an injury in fact, which for prospective harms must be
"immediate, concrete, and specific". The Court found that Knight had
sufficiently shown that the decision by the Council would affect her land
and senior water rights. Knight provided evidence that the City had been
in a water deficit for the last decade and that Tahoma's proposed subdivision would impact her ability to withdraw water. The Court noted that
preliminary plat approval was based on certain conditions that the developer must meet. If met, the City was then required to provide final plat
approval. The Council had affirmed the Hearing Examiner's decision,
but with fewer conditions (including removal of the requirement to show
an adequate water supply) than those imposed by the Examiner. Once
the developer met these conditions, final approval would certainly follow.
Following approval of the preliminary plat, Knight would have had no
further opportunity to challenge the ruling, and would thus suffer an immediate and concrete harm to her water rights. Further, Knight, as an
adjacent landowner and possessor or water rights, was an individual
whose interests should have been considered in the Council's decision.
Additionally, Knight had exhausted all other remedies by appealing to the
Council. Consequently, the court held that Knight possessed standing
under LUPA to challenge the Council's decision in the trial court. Accordingly, the court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's ruling.
The dissent argued that Knight's injury of possibly future infringement of her water rights was too speculative and was failed to establish
standing. Explaining that because preliminary plat approval was conditioned upon an adequate water supply, a good faith showing of acquiring
the necessary rights combined with the Hearing Examiners findings was
sufficient.
Anthony Perko

WYOMING
Platt v. Platt, 264 P.3d 804 (Wyo. 2011) (holding that a lower court
has the power to modify recommended partition reports submitted by
commissioners, including rejection of problematic easements proposed in
such reports).
Ralph Platt appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming ("Court")
following the Carbon County District Court's ("district court") decision to
modify the recommendations in a partition report. Ralph Platt owned a
ranch near Encampment, Wyoming, jointly with his brother, Wayne
Platt. After the parties quarreled over the ranch's management, Ralph
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Platt filed suit against Wayne Platt in district court in order to partition
the property. The district court appointed three commissioners to inspect the property and submit a partition report. The commissioners
subsequently presented a report to the district court, whereby each party
received a near-even share of land. However, both parties disputed the
two easements granted to Ralph Platt in the report because the easements
could potentially create unwanted title, maintenance, and water rights
issues. Ralph Platt suggested keeping the easements with some changes,
while Wayne Platt argued for eliminating both easements. Ultimately,
the district court accepted a modified version of the commissioners' recommendation in favor of Wayne Platt by accepting most of the proposals
but rejecting the two easements.
The main issues on appeal were whether the district court: -1) had the
authority to modify a recommended partition report; and 2) abused its
discretion in rejecting the two easements.
According to Wyoming statutory law, commissioners appointed by
the district court had the power to make partitions. The district court
had discretion to accept or reject the report, and enter an order accordingly. However, Wyoming statute did not directly address whether the
district court could modify a partition report.
In concluding that the district court had the authority to modify a partition report, the Court looked to case law for guidance. First, the Court
considered Wyoming precedent case law, which indicated that equitable
principles of relief may complement statutory codes in awarding partitions, thus expanding the district court's discretionary authority. This
suggested that the district court may - in addition to accepting or rejecting
partition reports - modify partition reports. Second, because Wyoming
adopted most of Ohio's partition statutes, the Court considered Ohio
case law, which emphasized a partition decision as a judicial power and
directed that equity control such decisions when statutes did not provide
clear guidance. Once the Court determined that the district court had
the authority to modify partition reports, and considered the various
problems the commissioners' proposed easements could create, the court
found that the district court correctly rejected the two easements.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding it did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting the commissioners' proposed easements.
Michael Billings

Rageth v. Sidon Irrigation Dist., 258 P.3d 712 (Wyo. 2011) (holding
that the calculation method used by an irrigation district to determine a
water delivery fee in the absence of an agreement is a material fact precluding summary judgment).
In 2008, Marvin Brent Rageth and Sherri Rageth ("Rageths") bought
559.75 acres of land with eight cubic feet per second of adjudicated water
rights conveyed to their property through the Bitter Creek Diversion and

